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Abstract  
Firm employment dynamics is at the core of the creative destruction process and it is important to have 
a clear picture of the gross and net job flows. This study is motivated by the ongoing interest of policy 
makers in the possible sources of job creation and destruction. The aim is to explore the dynamics of 
job creation, destruction and net job creation rates in Egypt and Turkey, including various firm 
characteristics, besides the firm size and age that have not been studied so far, such as the business-
state relations (SBRs), whether the firm has been accredited with an international qualification of 
quality assurance and control and whether one of the owners is female. The analysis relies on firm-
level data derived from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. We implement weighted ordinary least 
squares (OLS). Since the main point of interest is the SBRs we apply an Instrumental Variables 
Approach and the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) for robustness check and to deal with the 
endogeneity coming from the self-reported statements and the possible degree of reverse causality. The 
findings show constraints to finance and political instability are the main obstacles of SBRs in both 
countries, including also tax rates and constraints in electricity. The quality of SBRs is found to 
significantly contribute to job growth
1
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1. Introduction  
 
Employment growth, job creation and destruction and firm productivity have been always at the 
centre of interest of the governments around the globe and especially in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region, after the great recession of 2007. The MENA region countries are 
characterized by strong cyclical fluctuations and have experienced significant economic and political 
changes, such as the Arab Spring. Given the persistently high unemployment levels in emerging and 
developing economies, but also in developed and advanced countries and the slow and disappointing 
growth performance presented in the last 10 years, there is an increasingly strong focus amongst the 
policy makers about job creation and productivity growth. More specifically, while it is important to 
have a clear picture of the aggregate changes in employment and firm growth, it is even more important 
to investigate and describe the job growth rates, because these trends provide a much richer and 
insightful picture. This picture is useful to explore adjustment margins of the economy, such as whether 
the lower employment is a result of higher job destruction rates or lower job creation rates. Along with 
this analysis, it is equally important to know which groups of firms perform better (young vs. old, small 
vs. large), and whether governance and institutions expressed by the state business relations (SBRs) are 
important factors of job creation and destruction.  Business cycles and the extent of the creative 
destruction process are important aspects to be investigated, as for example young entrepreneurs and 
pioneering young business and firms may become relatively more important as creators of jobs.  
The aim of this study is to describe the dynamics of firms, focusing on the role of state business 
relations (SBRs) in the process of job creation and destruction in Egypt and Turkey. The analysis 
followed in this project can provide valuable insights about the firm dynamics assessment and 
employment growth. Various questions may arise, as whether the small firms result from high 
dynamism and if most of them are young startups or whether the lack of opportunities and especially 
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the obstacles in SBRs are present, especially dominated by large and old firms. Therefore, the main aim 
of this study is to explore the obstacles in SBRs faced by firms, such as electricity, trade, customs and 
labour regulations, corruption, practices of competitors in the informal sector, access to finance, tax 
administration and rates, and political instability among other factors. Overall, according to Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1999), the conventional measures that capture the job creation and destruction are based 
on gross terms, which is just the aggregation of net employment increases and decreases of firms, 
establishments or workplaces. To overcome these shortcomings, this study employs data including 
other firm characteristics and controlling for area-province, and exploring the impact of state-business 
relations on job flows.     
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents earlier studies and the value added in 
the literature. In section 3 we describe the methodological framework and the data employed in the 
empirical analysis. In section 4 we present the empirical results and in section 5 we discuss the main 
concluding remarks.   
 
2. Literature Review   
 
Earlier literature exploited administrative business-level data on employment dynamics and the job 
creation and destruction flows focusing mainly in USA. One of the first studies on job creation and 
destruction is by Davis et al. (1993) who investigated US firms in the manufacturing sector during the 
period 1972 to 1988. Their study shows that the most newly-created and newly-destroyed jobs are 
accounted by large firms and plants and the survival rates for the new and existing jobs are increased 
with the firm size. Furthermore, the authors found that smaller firms and plants exhibit higher gross job 
creation rates but not higher net job rates. The seminal works by Dunne et al. (1989), Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1990, 1999) and Davis et al. (1998) found that job creation and destruction occur 
simultaneously and the job reallocation shows systematic patterns over the business cycle, which 
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reallocation is defined as the sum of the absolute values of job creation and destruction. Various 
concluding remarks are derived from previous studies. Lotti et al. (2003), Neumark et al. (2011) and 
Hijzen et al (2010) found that the “Gibrat‟s Law” is violated (Gibrat, 1931), since their results support 
a negative relationship between firm size and growth. However, Haltiwanger et al. (2013) found an 
insignificant relationship between size and growth when the regressions control for firm age. Another 
field of literature focuses on the cyclicality of employment by different types of firms. A number of 
studies found that the small firms respond more to monetary and financial shocks (Gertler and 
Gilchrist, 1994; Sharpe, 1994), while Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) shows that the employment in 
the large firms is more related to unemployment rates changes than in the small firms. Konings (1995) 
using a sample of 993 large UK manufacturing companies over the period 1972-1986 found an annual 
average job creation rate of 1.6 per cent and an average job destruction rate of 5.6 per cent. Fort et al. 
(2013) using data for USA over the years 1981-2010 found that in the downturns of the business 
cycles, the net job creation rates between large mature and small young firms declines. Other studies 
focus on the role of credit constraints, which is explored also here, where during the period of the 
financial crisis of 2007 new small-medium workplaces were hit mostly compared to the large 
incumbents (Butcher and Bursnall, 2013). In another study Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) use the same 
sample of firms and explore the impact of oil shocks on job flows. The main results show that a higher 
sensitivity is present for the job destruction than job creation except for young and small firms. Masso 
et al. (2005) investigated the job flows, labour reallocation and structural changes in Estonia, and they 
found that job creation and destruction rates are very high when these are compared internationally, 
higher than in almost any other European country and roughly at the levels reported in the USA. 
Criscuolo et al. (2014), used a sample of 17 OECD countries and Brazil, and they explored the job 
creation and destruction. The findings suggest that among small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), 
young firms play a central role in creating jobs. On the other hand, the old SMEs contribute more to the 
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job destruction, so age is negatively related to employment growth. Furthermore, the authors found that 
young firms create new jobs throughout the business cycle, even during the financial crisis of 2008. 
Yang (2017) explores the job creation and destruction for Japanese firms. The empirical results show 
that the wage has a negative impact on job creation and increases job destruction. This can be explained 
by the fact that a higher level of wages reduces the expected value from an occupied job, leading to less 
job creation by firms, while higher wages also lead to higher reservation productivity; thus, more jobs 
fall below the reservation productivity and are destroyed. On the other hand, productivity increases job 
creation. Other studies have expanded the sample of analysis to explore global patterns. For instance 
the study by Ayyagari et al. (2011) investigates the contribution of small firms to employment, job 
creation, and growth in a large sample of 49,370 firms in 104 developing countries over the period 
2006-2010. Their findings suggest that small firms significantly contribute to total job creation. 
However, the study reveals also that the small firms present lower growth productivity besides the job 
creation which is not necessarily associated with higher growth rates in these firms. Aga et al. (2015) 
using a large sample of firms in the World Bank ES in 117 developing economies found that the small-
medium enterprises (SMEs) and older establishments contribute more to the employment growth and 
the net job creation is negatively associated with firm size and age. However, the authors suggest that 
the firm size can be sensitive to specifications. In particular, as in the study by Haltiwanger et al (2013) 
when the start-ups are removed from the analysis the net job growth rates become positively correlated 
with the firm size, leading to the conclusion that firm age is more important factor than size.  
A similar study with ours is the paper by Dogan et al. (2017) that examines the relationship between 
job creation and firm size in all non-farm Turkish businesses with 20 or more employees over the 
period 2003-2010. Their main concluding remarks show that small firms, and specifically firms with 
employees between 20 and 100, have higher mean job flow rates, including job creation, job 
destruction and net job creation rates. Also the authors found that job creation rates in services are 
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higher than those in manufacturing. However, their study differs from various aspects. First, and very 
important, they use a large dataset from firm-level data provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute 
(TurkStat) which contains a much larger sample than ours. However, our aim is to use the World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys for Egypt and Turkey, allowing us to have the same variables used in the analysis. 
More specifically, the information provided in these surveys is more detailed, even though the sample 
is smaller. Furthermore, we have information on the SBRs, which is the main factor of our analysis and 
we describe them in more details in the next sections. These relations are important to be included in 
the analysis, as can be crucial for the job creation. Second, they examine the job flow rates only 
considering the firm size and age, while our study extends the analysis to include more factors of job 
flow rates.   
 
 
3. Conceptual Framework and Research Methodology    
 
In this section we describe the methodology followed in the empirical work and the measures refer 
to job flows (Ayyagari et al., 2011; Criscuolo et al., 2014; Aga et al., 2015). To illustrate the job flows 
we need to define the following variables: the number of Units (I) which is the number of active units 
in a cell c, such as young and small-medium firms. The second variable is the employment (E). This is 
defined as the sum of employment across all firms in a cell c as:  
 



I
i
itct EE
1
                                                                                                                                           
(1) 
 
Where i refers to firm and t to time-year. The Gross Job Creation (JC) is the sum of all positive firm-
level job variations expressed as   1,tiE from year t to t+1 within a cell and is defined as: 

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(2) 
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Similarly, the Gross Job destruction (JD) is the sum of all positive firm-level job variations expressed 
as   1,E from year t to t+1 within a cell and is defined as the absolute values of the following sum: 
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Next we consider the net job creation which is just the difference between job creation and job 
destruction and it: 
 
cttcctctct EEJDJCNJC  1,                                                                                                          
(4) 
 
 The next measures refer to job creation and destruction rates. The gross job creation rate (JCR) over 
the average employment in the 2-year period is expressed as:  
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Next we define the Gross job destruction rate (JDR) over the average employment in the 2-year period 
as:  
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Likewise, as in the case of the net job creation flow we will take the difference of (5)-(6) to calculate 
the net job creation rate (NJCR) and it will be: 
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The general regression for the job flows takes the following form:  
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Y denotes the outcome of interest, which job creation and destruction rates and the net employment 
growth for industry k, in district-governorate j and time t.  X is a vector of standard control variables 
explored in the studies discussed before, and this includes the firm size and age. Set μk controls for 
fixed-industry effects, set lj denotes the district-governorate fixed effects, and θt is the time-fixed 
effects, while ε is the error term. However, our aim is to expand the analysis including also additional 
firm characteristics and the obstacles mentioned earlier, such as access to finance, trade and labour 
regulations, and political instability among others. Thus, in the general regression framework (8) vector 
X, besides the obstacles and business-government relations, contains other variables. In particular, 
following earlier studies we include various firm characteristics, apart from the SBRs, to explore their 
relationship to the main outcomes and these are reported in table 1. We use the two main variables 
employed in the earlier literature, which is the firm size and age expressed in logarithms. Other 
variables include whether one of the principal owners is female, whether the firm has been accredited 
with an international qualification of quality control-assurance, if the establishment is a part of a larger 
firm, the legal status of the firm. Additionally we include the foreign ownership which is defined as a 
dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm has at least 10% foreign ownership, and whether the firm is 
exporter and we control for region and the year of survey (Aga et al., 2015; Aga and Francis, 2017).   
(Inset Table 1) 
As we mentioned earlier, while the main aim is to explore the impact of SBRs on job flows, another 
purpose of the analysis is also to explore the association between job flows and other firm 
characteristics. Also according to the study by Aga et al. (2015) we define the destruction rates also as 
contraction rates since the ES data do not contain information on establishments exiting from the 
market and this may create a “survival” bias.   According to Stiglitz (1996) there is a clear rationale that 
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industrial policies supporting the market may promote the economic performance. The effects can vary 
greatly depending on the context. For instance the study by Kingombe and te Velde (2016) shows that 
whilst the special economic zones (SEZs) were instrumental in upgrading the economic production 
structures in China, Malaysia and Mauritius, this was much less important in countries, such as Nigeria 
and Tanzania. State-business relations (SBRs) are relations between the private and public sector and 
are shaped by the way businesses and states interact (Leftwich 2009). According to Sen and te Velde 
(2009) effective SMRs may affect the industrial development and firm growth by two opposite forces. 
First, overcoming market failures, such as the market alone may not be able to achieve the optimal 
allocation of resources including areas, such as the innovation, climate change and education. Second 
the state may not be able to address market failures on their own, because they can be captured by 
elites, suffer from moral hazard problems or are unlikely to have perfect information (Hausmann and 
Rodrik, 2003). Nevertheless, effective SBRs can address coordination, market and government failures 
through effective communication and removal of related binding constraints to growth, by improving 
the investment climate and reducing the policy uncertainty and instability.  
Next we discuss the variables included in the regression analysis, which involves other firm 
characteristics apart from the firm size and age that have been used so far in earlier studies. We should 
notice that as these additional variables can be endogenous, but the estimates remain robust when we 
exclude them in terms of the estimated coefficient of SBRs explored. Nevertheless, the magnitude may 
change and this is explained that the variables we include can be confounders and excluding them we 
can also create confounding bias. The first two variables refer to firm age and size expressed as the 
logarithm of the total number of full-time permanent employment and the number of years the 
establishment has been in operation. Regarding the firm size an issue is that we are unable to capture 
precisely the firm size given the fact that it can be a part of another firm. Ayyagari et al. (2011) 
explored only the sample of these firms that are not part of a larger establishment as a robustness 
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check. However, to avoid using additional regressions, we include a dummy indicating whether the 
firm is part of a large organization. Moreover, we include a quadratic term in firm size and age 
following the studies by Jovanovic (1982), Evans (1987a; 1987b), Lawless (2014), Aga and Francis 
(2017) and Yang (2017).  The quadratic term in firm size will allow us to explore Gibrat‟s law where 
the size and growth are independent. Furthermore, Lawless (2014) explored different age groups where 
and inverse relationship between employment growth and lagged size for the young firms was found, 
but this declines in magnitude when they implemented the analysis separately for older age groups. For 
this reason we include also the quadratic terms in firm size and age to explore whether the size or age 
matter and whether a firm has reached a mature state.  
Lawless (2014) and Aga and Francis (2017) explored also a similar set of variables. Even though the 
main outcome of interest in their study was the probability of firm‟s exit, the justification of using these 
variables fits within our analysis. One variable is related with the firm‟s ownership and is defined by a 
dummy taking value 1 if the establishment has at least 10 percent foreign ownership. The nature of the 
firm‟s foreign-ownership has been explored in earlier studies (Bernard and Sjöholm, 2003; Baldwin 
and Yan 2011; Gelübcke and Wagner, 2012; Aga and Francis, 2017). These studies used this variable 
based on the assumption that foreign-owned could face lower probabilities and risk of exit due to 
international connection, economies of scales, access to information and markets and possible favours 
in terms of tax treatment. On the other hand, also foreign-owned firms may face problems related to 
lack of knowledge of the local market and culture. Even though we explore the job flows, the 
argument, as we mentioned earlier, relies on the fact that employment growth and job creation can be 
also related to the surviving of the firms.  Another interesting variable, which has not been explored so 
far in the literature of job creation, is the gender of the ownership. Previous studies found that women 
are more risk averse and more likely to invest in activities with lower risk than men (Croson and 
Gneezy, 2009; Faccio et al., 2016). As before, this literature refers to the firm growth and exiting rates, 
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but since we analyse the employment growth and job creation, this variable can be strongly related to 
our topic. The legal status of the firm is another control which refers on whether the firm is 
shareholding company with shares traded or not, partnership or limited partnership. We include this 
variable to control for possible selection as firms with limited liability have higher growth compared 
with other firms with different legal structure (Harhoff et al., 1998).  
Labour productivity is another control used and can be a proxy indicating the firm performance and 
whether it affects the firm‟s surviving probability. However, the direction of the impact can be mixed, 
because an increase in labour productivity could cause job losses as a fewer number of employees will 
be needed to produce the same amount of goods. On the other hand, a rise in the labour productivity 
may lead to firm‟s production expansion, products, markets, leading in this way to job creation. In 
other words, higher labour productivity may lead to higher demand for new workers.  
The last control variables include the sampling region defined by the district-governorate and 
whether the establishment is operating in the manufacturing or services sector that intend to capture 
unobserved heterogeneity and time-invariant conditions at the sector and area level affecting particular 
firms.  Also these controls will allow us to capture for location characteristics, where certain business 
areas provide a better or worse qualified labour force, demand preferences for specific products and 
services affecting firm‟s performance, and thus job creation. Following a similar logic we also include 
a dummy whether the firm has been accredited with an international quality certification and whether is 
exporter defined as if at least the 10 percent of firm‟s annual sales is going to exports. In particular, 
firms that export may have access to international markets and information as well as other 
advantageous positions that affect their performance. 
However, we should notice that our main variable of interest which is the SBRs, may be endogenous 
to firm growth implying the coefficients derived by the effect of regression (8) would be invalid. The 
three main courses of endogeneity include the omitted variables bias, reverse causality and the self-
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statement and perception about the obstacles. For example, some managers may report obstacles that 
are actually overestimated or on the inverse underestimated, or there could be cases where some 
inefficient firms may overstate the constraints and obstacles that they actually face (Beck et al., 2005; 
Carlin et al., 2006). Therefore, SBRs may be endogenous either because of measurement error due to 
perception, but also because of possible reverse causality between SBRs and the outcomes of interest 
explored in the study. In other words the direction of the effect can go from SBRs to job flows, while 
on the other hand firms with higher job creation rates may also over-report the effectiveness of SBRs 
and under-reporting the severity of the obstacles.  For the endogeneity issue we implement the Two-
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) method and we use a set of instrumental variables for SBRs which are 
available in the ES and are based on earlier studies. Additionally, this can be solved up to some degree 
by using „objective‟ rather than „subjective‟ indicators. These include whether the firm had to pay a gift 
or informal payment to receive electricity, water or phone line connection, and permits related to 
construction and operation. However, there is a large proportion of missing values and the analysis may 
further lead to selection bias.  
A common practice of dealing with endogeneity in this literature is the implementation of 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). The study by Sen and Te Velde (2009) used lagged variables 
as instruments at the macro level, assuming that institutional development, determine the effectiveness 
of SBRs. However, due to proper data unavailability, such as long panel datasets, this method is 
infeasible. Furthermore, we argue that lagged instruments are not always enough to claim exogeneity.  
In addition, Rojid et al. (2009) estimated a system of equations which allows for endogeneity issues 
explicitly using the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) estimations. Nevertheless, these studies 
were unable to provide suitable instruments. The World Bank ES and in particular the Global 
Methodology surveys, provide a rich and valuable pool of possible candidate instruments for the SBRs.  
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Regarding the instruments used we follow similar procedures from earlier studies (Fisman and 
Svensson, 2007; Şeker and Yang (2014; Alm et al., 2016), and also we propose a set of new variables 
that have not been employed so far. In particular, the first variable is completed by the interviewer and 
the question is “It is my perception that the responses to the questions regarding opinions and 
perceptions are”, and the possible answers include a) Truthful; b) Somewhat Truthful and c) Not 
truthful. The second variable answers to the question “Accuracy of responses to questions regarding 
figures” with the possible answers a) Are taken directly from the establishment‟s records; b) Are 
estimates computed with some precision; c) Are arbitrary an unreliable numbers and d) Some cases in 
books and some from estimates. The third variable answers to the question “This questionnaire was 
completed in” and the possible answers include a) One visit in face-to-face interview with one person; 
b) One visit in face-to-face interview with different managers/staff  and c) Several visits. Our 
suggestion of using these three categorical variables lies on the argument that they are correlated with 
the state-business perceptions and cannot directly affect the outcomes of interest. About the first two 
variables, even though the state-business relations can have an impact on firm‟s performance, the 
judgment and perception of the interviewer cannot affect them, but it may have a correlation with the 
reliability of the individual‟s response. The third variable is also a strong instrument, as the perception 
about obstacles and state-business relation may vary depending if the questions are replied by the same 
person, different person, but even by the same person across several visits. This will also be confirmed 
by our 2SLS estimates where the endogeneity hypothesis is rejected; implying that conditioning on 
these variables there is no correlation between the instruments, outcomes and the error term. 
Furthermore, in all cases we reject the null hypothesis that instruments are weak.  The rest of the 
instrumental variables include: percent of firms identifying various obstacles as a major obstacle 
related to access to finance, crime, percent of firms with loan. We report the instrumental variables in 
table 1 for more details.   
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Alm et al. (2016) used two methods to deal with endogeneity; a propensity score matching (PSM) 
and two stage least squares to estimate the relationship between corruption and tax evasion in 32 
countries. The instruments employed in their empirical work involve other bribery activities of the 
firms. These variables include whether the firm bribed authorities or paid an informal payment, such as 
to get connection to infrastructure, business permit and license and to obtain a government contract. 
While we could make use of the same variables as instruments, our analysis is limited due to the 
missing values and the very small number of observations left, which most likely will lead to selection 
bias and the use of a non-representative sample. Şeker and Yang (2014) explored the impact of bribery 
solicitations on performance of firms in Latin America. Our identification strategy is similar to theirs, 
as the authors for the firm‟s bribery exposure use as instrument the average bribery exposure in the 
firms‟ sector and location cluster. While they explore the bribery solicitations our aim is to explore the 
impact of SBRs on firm job flows. Similarly, we obtain the total percentage of the variables presented 
in table 1 by the 4-digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) code that applies to the 
main operations of the firms and location. In a similar study by Fisman and Svensson (2007), the 
relationship between bribery payments and firm growth in Uganda over the period 1995–1997 was 
examined. The authors used industry-location averages of bribe payments as instruments and they 
found that the negative effect is considerably stronger compared with the ordinary least squares 
method. Following these studies we use as instruments for the SBRs the three main variables proposed, 
which refer to the truthfulness of the responses regarding the opinions and perceptions, the number of 
visits to complete the questionnaire and the accuracy of responses. For the rest of the variables we take 
the percentages at industry-location level, where the industry is indicated by the ISIC and location 
refers to the sampling region. This is expressed by governorates in Egypt and Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) at level 1-region in Turkey. 
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4. Data     
 
The analysis relies on data derived from the Enterprise Surveys (ES) provided by the World Bank
2
. 
One characteristic of the data is that the surveys are stratified by firm size, industry and geographical 
location which shows that the sample could be quite representative; however, other characteristics, 
such as age, are excluded from the sampling and therefore the firms may not be representative even 
though the strata are randomly selected.  Also, another advantage of the sampling is that job flows 
measures are well defined and they capture new jobs at the establishment level than changes occurred 
due to mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, this leads to the problem that we are unable to 
measure the firm size accurately for multi-establishment firms (Ayyagari et al., 2011) and this may lead 
to similar results as in the study by Aga et al. (2011).  However, we may limit this bias, as we known 
from the survey that the establishments report whether they are part of a larger firm. In particular, we 
could estimate a regression including only those firms. Nevertheless, we will include this information 
as a control variable as we discussed in the previous section. In an effort to use representative samples 
we limit our analysis to the global surveys conducted by World Bank in the countries we explore. In 
particular we use the cross section surveys in Turkey over the years 2008 and 2013 and the respective 
surveys in Egypt in years 2013 and 2016. We should notice that these surveys include also the panel 
component where the same firms are followed in two years. Nevertheless, we follow the strategy of 
earlier studies and we make use of the full cross section surveys, including both panel and non-panel 
component, which provides us the possibility to view and follow a comparative analysis of the trends 
across the two economies (Aga et al., 2015; Aga and Francis, 2017).   
The World Bank (ES) cover many topics, and are followed by a core questionnaire that allows us to 
make a comparative analysis across firms, sectors, countries and years. The core questionnaire contains 
questions answered by the business owners and high ranked managers providing objective, but also 
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subjective information about the business environment. More specifically, the subjective questions 
refer to evaluations about the severity of obstacles that firms face. The interviewers ask firms to rank 
16 components of the business environment, indicating which one presents the largest obstacle and to 
rank them on a scale of 1-5, with 1 being no obstacle and 5 being a severe obstacle. Thus, this allows us 
to identify the top obstacles of a firm.  
First, we report the summary statistics for the job flows in table 2. We present the proportions by 
size class which is constructed using the full-time permanent employees and is classified in three 
categories defined as small for the firms with less than 20 but more than 4 employees, as medium with 
a number of employees between 20 and 99 and large for those with more than 99 employees. The 
second category is by age which is split in three classes, as 0-2, 3-5 and older than 5 years. In figures 1-
2 we illustrate the histograms for the firm size respectively in Egypt and Turkey. Similar with the 
summary statistics presented in table 2, we observe that the structure of the firm size in both countries 
is almost identical where small firms dominate in both economies. We should note that in the 
descriptive statistics reported we use the sampling weights provided by the World Bank ES, as we will 
use them in the regression analysis.   
Overall, the main concluding remark is that the majority of the establishments in both countries are 
small ranging between 60 and 63 per cent followed by the medium-size firms at 33-38 percent and the 
large firms at 7.40 and 9.37 percent respectively in Egypt and Turkey. While there are some similarities 
in the firm size when we consider firms in both manufacturing and services sectors, the differences 
become more obvious when we split the sample. In particular, the 59 percent of the establishments in 
the manufacturing sector are small in Egypt compared to 52 percent in Turkey. Also the 8.5 percent of 
the firms in Turkey are large compared to the 4.70 percent of firms in Egypt. So far we saw that the 
majority of the firms are small, but the age presents a different picture where the majority of the firms 
have been established more than 5 years ago. Nevertheless, there is more heterogeneity in the 
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economies explored regarding the age structure. More specifically, the 7.5 percent of the firms are very 
young, while the respective percentage in Turkey is 2.2. Similarly, the 14.5 percent of the firms in 
Egypt have been established between 3-5 years ago compared to the 10 percent in Turkey. Regarding 
both sectors, the majority of the firms are older than 5 years at 78 and 87 percent respectively in Egypt 
and Turkey. A similar situation is illustrated for the firms operating in the manufacturing sector, while 
the number of very young firms is significantly larger than the proportion of those firms in Turkey with 
percentages 8.7 and 1.4 respectively.  
(Insert Table 2) 
(Insert Figures 1-2) 
In figures 3 and 4 we illustrate the major obstacles in SBRs respectively in Egypt and Turkey. The 
reason of presenting figures 3-4 is that we aim to examine the impact of the most significant SBR 
separately to be able to disentangle their effects. The figure is based on proportions about how the 
respondents evaluate the obstacles and which ones affect mostly the operation of the establishment.  
While we could include them in one regression this could create problems with multicollinearity which 
will not allow us to explore the actual impact and unable to disentangle their effects. On the other hand 
we could create an index using all the 15 obstacles within a factor or principal component analysis. One 
problem is that some loadings will be low that the item will be uncorrelated with the factor, while also 
the loadings may vary within items with reasonably high loadings. In the case we would be interested 
to create an index using weighted averages, the factor or principal components analysis could be useful 
to investigate the overall impact of the total SBRs. However, we are not interested on the effect of the 
SBRs in total, but we aim to explore individually the impact of the major obstacles in SBRs, so creating 
and aggregated index will not be useful to our analysis.   
In figure 3 we observe that the major obstacles affecting the operations of the establishment include 
the access to finance and credit, electricity and political instability. Even though the latter dropped in 
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2013, still remains the most important obstacle in SBRs.  Tax rates, business permits, and corruption, 
as well as, the obstacles in labour regulations which increase in 2013 are other major obstacles. 
However, we will limit our analysis to the three most important obstacles mentioned above. Similarly, 
in figure 4 we observe that the major obstacles in SBRs for Turkey is the access to finance and credit; 
inadequate education; political instability; practices of competitors in the informal sector and tax rates. 
Nevertheless, we observe a large reduction in 2013 for the obstacle related to access to finance, 
inadequate education and political instability, but a large increase in tax rates and competition from 
firms operating in the informal sector. Also, we note an increase in corruption and electricity. Even 
though the reduction in access to finance and political instability has been noted, we will explore them 
as they remain two of the four most important obstacles in 2013. Additionally we will explore the tax 
rates, competition from the informal sector. 
(Insert Figures 3-4) 
 
The sampling methodology followed in the ES is a stratified random sampling where the units are 
grouped within homogeneous groups and then simple random samples are selected within each group. 
Following previous studies (Aga et al., 2015; Aga and Francis, 2017) in order to yield accurate 
population estimates for the main parameters of interest in the empirical work of this study we account 
for sampling weight in both descriptive statistics presented in this section, and in the regression 
analysis illustrated in the empirical results section. As we mentioned earlier, the strata for the ES 
includes the firm size, business sector and geographical location-region within a country.  
In table 3 we report the summary statistics using sampling weights for the main control variables. 
The purpose of presenting the descriptive statistics is mainly to highlight the similarities but most 
importantly the differences that characterize the firms across the two economies explored. Regarding 
firm size and age we observe that the averages are very close to both economies, where the average 
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number of employees is 115 and the average age is 21 in Egypt, while the respective values in Turkey 
are 138 employees and 24 years. However, the rest of the variables present large difference between the 
two countries. In particular the female ownership in Egypt is only 6.8 percent, while the percentage in 
Turkey reaches the 30 percent. This shows that female entrepreneurship is more common in Turkey, 
while women in Egypt have rather less opportunities to establish or take part to business activities. 
Also, the 19 percent of the sample if a part of a larger firm, while only the 8.8 percent of the firms in 
Turkey is part of another establishment. This may be explained also by the foreign ownership, where 
the 6 percent of the Egyptian firms in our sample has at least 10 percent of foreign ownership and the 
respective percentage in Turkey is 4.3 percent. Regarding the international quality certification only the 
10 percent of the sample has been accredited with it in Egypt compared with the 31.5 percent in 
Turkey. Also large differences are observed in the firms that are defined as exporters which is only 7.6 
percent in Egypt compared to 20 percent in Turkey. These statistics illustrate the openness of the firms 
which is significantly higher in Turkey. Moreover, the average labour productivity in Egypt is negative 
at -3 percent, while in Turkey is positive and equal at 4.8 percent.    
(Insert Table 3) 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
We start our analysis by presenting the job flows by sector in table 4 and by firm size in table 5. We 
observe major differences between the two economies, as in Egypt the net job flows are all positive 
when we consider the total sample of the firms, but also when we split the sample to manufacturing and 
services workplaces, while in Turkey the net job flows are positive in the services sector, and they 
become negative in the manufacturing sector and the total economy.  Furthermore, another difference is 
that the net job rates are higher in the services sector in Turkey and in manufacturing sector in Egypt. 
As the Turkey‟s GDP is significantly higher than Egypt‟s we would expect that the employment 
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growth would be also higher in the manufacturing sector in Turkish firms. However, when we consider 
the net job creation rates, these are very low in both economies, even when these are expressed in 
negative terms. One important fact is that the small and young firms seem to be the engine of job 
creation growth in Egypt, as according to the table 5 we observe that the share of the employment in 
the small-medium firms employing between 1 and 100 workers is almost 75 per cent, while the rest of 
the 25 per cent of the employment share consists of the large firms with more than 100 employees. The 
exact same situation holds in the case of Turkey where the 73 per cent of the employment share 
consists of firms with less than 100 employees.  
In figures 5-8 we illustrate the net job creation rates in Egypt and Turkey for firms operating in 
manufacturing and services sector by firm size and age. At a first glance we observe major differences 
not only between firms in the two sectors, but also between firms across the two economies. In 
particular, the net job creation rate is higher in medium-sized firm in Egypt and the manufacturing 
sector, but also to Turkey, but negative. On the contrary, in the services sector we show that large firms 
present the largest and positive net job creation rate. The situation in Turkey differs in terms that the 
net job creation rates in the manufacturing sector are negative, while the rates in services sector are 
positive and higher in the large firms. Regarding the firm age the two economies present also 
differences, where the young firms (aged 3-5 years) present the higher net job creation rates, while 
older firms in Egypt perform better. This could be explained by the three-age group classification. 
Overall, the results show that firm size and age are not always monotonic and for this reason also we 
will include quadratic terms in these variables to capture also these variations. Also, the net job creation 
rates are very low in both economies, even though in the case which are positive, indicating rather a 
slow growth and stagnation.  
(Insert Tables 4-5) 
 
(Insert Figures 5-8) 
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The first major and common obstacle in the SBRs across Egypt and Turkey is the access to finance 
and the second is the political instability. The remained two obstacles differ, as in Egypt the majority of 
the firms state that electricity is a major constraint, while corruption is chosen because it is increased 
over the period 2013-2016. For Turkey the other two main obstacles in SBRs include the tax rates and 
practices of competitors in the informal sector.  Obstacles regarding the firms‟ access to finance and 
also corruption allow large firms to be unfairly subsided and small firms more “taxed” creating less 
jobs in the economy. Large firms in both countries have not actually grown in the process and therefore 
have not created more jobs but are born large and are results of the privatization process of public and 
state-owned firms, including supply of power, post offices, telecommunications and transportation 
(Şeker and Correa, 2010; World Bank, 2014).  In Turkey the labour force is even shrinking considering 
a part of privatisation in the national post services.  These obstacles are more common to small-
medium firms making them unable to compete with the old and large privileged firms. Constraints to 
access to finance and political instability have a negative impact on the net job creation rates in both 
countries, while the 2SLS coefficients are higher indicating that OLS may underestimate the real effect 
of these obstacles. Previous studies confirm that constraints about access to finance are reported more 
frequently to small-medium firms and have less access to formal sources of external finance (Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). This can be explained by poorly developed capital markets, but also by 
corruption that favour only large and privileged firms and isolate the small firms that are in more need 
of financing their operations. These limitations have a negative impact on firm‟s performance, 
including financial performance and sales and thus an overall negative effect on employment growth. 
Klapper et al. (2006) found also that regulations fostering property right protection and access to 
finance enhance entry and thus job creation.  
In line with limitations and constraints on access to finance we observe also that the competition 
from firms in the informal sector is another major obstacle of SBRs in Turkey. This can be also a result 
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of the related constraints to finance and credit that forbid the firms in the formal sector to employ more 
workers. This is also connected with the tax rates, which is a major constraint in Turkey. More 
specifically, high tax corporate taxes will create obstacles to firms, and especially the small firms that 
are in more need for finance and capital, allowing workplaces in the informal sector to attract more 
employment. The practices from the informal sector can be also related with product pricing as workers 
employed in these firms are not registered in social security and they do not pay taxes resulting to 
lower prices of the final product and less job creation for firms in the formal sector. Earlier studies also 
support that electricity is a major constraint for the firm growth and therefore an unreliable supply of 
electricity can have also a significant adverse effect on job creation and growth. A World Bank report 
(2008) finds that expensive, unreliable or unavailable electricity is a major barrier for firms in Kenya. 
In another study by Lea and Hanmer (2009) unreliable supply of power and electricity is a major 
binding constraint in business in Malawi, as well as, a constraint of investments in industries with high 
demand for power.  Similarly, firms in Tanzania and Liberia recognize unreliable electricity as a major 
obstacle to firm operations. Therefore, power outages due to lack of proper infrastructure and also 
expensive supply of power will have a negative impact on sales and consequently on job creation. 
Power outages in Tanzania cost firms around 15 per cent of annual sales, according to a 2013 survey of 
813 firms (Lemma et al., 2016).  
In table 6 we report the results for the firms in Egypt. While political instability is the major obstacle 
in SBRs according to figure 3, constraints related to access to finance and electricity present a stronger 
effect, while corruption is insignificant. Following also the results for Turkey, we estimated the tax 
rates as a proxy for SBRs in Egypt and the results were found again insignificant. The results in table 7 
confirm the obstacles of SBRs illustrated in figure 4, where tax rates present the higher proportion as 
the major constraint to businesses, followed by access to finance constraints and political instability. 
However, the estimates about the firms operating in the informal sector are found insignificant, even 
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though the proportion is among the highest in the obstacles of SBRs in figure 4. The only significant 
and negative impact is on the gross job creation rate.  
Overall, the most important constraint in Egypt is access to finance, followed by electricity and 
political instability. In particular, the effect of constraints to access to finance reduce the gross and net 
job creation rates, but have no impact on the job destruction rates. The effect becomes even stronger 
when we estimate the repressions with 2SLS. The second stronger effect is observed in electricity. 
Even though the effect on gross job rates is insignificant, it becomes negative and significant in the net 
job creation rates regressions. Finally, political instability presents a significant negative sign in both 
gross and net job creation rates. As we mentioned, the results in table 7 are in line with the figure 4, 
where in the majority tax rates are the major constraints in businesses in Turkey. As we see the 
negative effect on net job creation rates is almost tripled compared to political instability and almost 50 
percent higher than the access to finance. On the other hand, constraints in SBRs related to practices 
from firms in the informal sector are insignificant in the job destruction, as well in the net job creation 
rates regressions, while are negative and significant only when the outcome is the gross job creation 
rates. Our results also confirm the study by Ayyagari et al. (2005) who used firm level survey data on 
the business environment across 80 countries and found that finance, crime and political instability are 
the only obstacles that have a direct impact on firm growth with access to finance being the most robust 
and most important among those. Furthermore, we should notice, that according to figure 4, corruption 
and electricity can be also considered as other major constraints of SBRs in Turkey. Nevertheless, we 
estimated the relevant regression and we found insignificant coefficients.   
For the remained variables in the empirical work we observe that the results are significantly 
different compared to those we found in the case of firms in Egypt. In particular, firms in Turkey with 
female owners and accredited with an international certification of quality present higher gross and net 
job creation rates, while the relationship between job destruction rates and international certification of 
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quality is negative. However, the information about the gender ownership is not detailed as the number 
of female owners is not provided. While this study has not discussed so far any theoretical framework 
explaining this positive relationship between female employers and job creation, a survey conducted by 
EY in 2016 among 2,673 entrepreneurs around the globe, entitled as Global Job Creation Survey, 
reveals some related results. First, it seems that women lead the job creation stakes who anticipate an 
average growth rate of 10.9 per cent in the next year (2017), compared to the 8.3 per cent among the 
male entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the 43 per cent of the women stated that they hired more employees 
than expected in the previous year -2015- compared to the 39 per cent of the male entrepreneurs. 
Another characteristic of the survey‟s results is that the 56 per cent of the female entrepreneurs younger 
than the age of 35 reported a better job creation rate than the expected in 2015, while the 16 per cent 
expect a 16 per cent average increase in the workforce size. The respective values for the men in the 
same age brackets are 56 and 13 per cent (EY, 2016).   
Firm size and age are two main variables employed in the literature. As we mentioned earlier we 
include quadratic terms for both variables.  One major difference between the two countries explored is 
that the quadratic term of firm size is significant in firms in Egypt, while only the linear term is 
significant in the case of Turkey. In particular, according to table 6 the firm size is significant in job 
creation and net job creation rates, but insignificant regarding job destruction rates. The turning point 
for the job creation rate and the OLS estimates is 267 employees, while the respective turning point 
using the 2SLS is 372. This indicates that after some point of firm size the job creation rates become 
negative. The same applies also for the net job creation rates with a turning point at 25 employees. 
Thus, firms employing more than 25 workers are more likely to contribute negative to the net 
employment growth. A similar concluding remark is observed for the firm age but the coefficients are 
significant only in the case of the job creation rates. In particular, according to the OLS and 2SLS 
estimates, firms older than 15-16 years create a fewer number of jobs compared to the young firms.  
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The situation is quite different in Turkey, where firm size in linear terms is significant, and both 
linear and quadratic terms of firm age are insignificant. Aga et al. (2015) explored a large sample of 
firms derived from the World Bank ES. They found that when the regressions control also for the firm 
age the negative association between net job creation rates and firm size disappears and in some cases 
becomes positive. In our case the results remain the same when we also exclude the firm age. 
Additionally, we estimated the regressions excluding the quadratic term of the firm size and we found 
positive and significant coefficients at 1 percent level and equal at 0.2834; 0.2994 and 0.0242 
respectively for the gross job creation, destruction and the net rates. Also we estimated the regression 
excluding the firm size and still the firm age coefficient remained insignificant. 
Another major difference is the firms accredited with an international quality of certification which 
is found to be negative in Egypt and the job creation rates, but positive and significant in both gross and 
net job creation rates in Turkish firms. This can be explained by the fact that large firms in Egypt are 
more likely to be qualified with this certification. As we have shown earlier these firms also create 
fewer jobs. In particular, the average number of employees in firms with this type of certification is 
almost 400, and the respective average number of employees reaches almost 55 in firms with no quality 
certification. However, the estimated coefficients in the job destruction and net job creation rates 
regressions become insignificant. On the contrary, in Turkey firms with international quality 
certification present higher gross and net job rates. This is in line also with the firm size, where large 
firms also are more likely to have this type of certification, as also more likely that at least one female 
will be the owner-employer. Furthermore, the firms that are part of a larger establishment present a 
positive correlation with the net job creation rates. 
On the contrary common characteristics among the two countries include that foreign ownership and 
exporting countries are not significantly correlated with the job creation and destruction rates. While 
this can be owned to the model specification and inclusion of variables that may block their effects, we 
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do not explicitly analyse in the study. Also in both economies we observe that firms in the services 
sector create fewer jobs, but at the same time they also destroy fewer jobs, resulting to an insignificant 
net job creation rate. Regarding the labour productivity we observe that the estimated coefficients of 
job creation and the net job creation are positive and significant, while the coefficient of job destruction 
is insignificant. One possible explanation for the positive exhibition of productivity is that more 
productive jobs may increase the job creation by firms, because higher productivity contributes to the 
expected value from a job and so firms create more jobs due to increases on productivity. The results 
are consistent with the study by Yang (2017) who found that productivity is positively related to job 
creation in a sample of Japanese firms. We should note that this variable can be endogenous and exhibit 
a reverse causality with the outcomes of interest. Nevertheless, our main aim of the study is to explore 
the impact of SBRs on job flows. Also, excluding this variable from the regressions, the estimated 
coefficients of the SBRs remain similar.   
Also we check whether the instruments used in the 2SLS are valid. In all cases we reject the null 
hypothesis of the weak instruments test, implying that the instruments proposed in the analysis are 
causing or are correlated with the main endogenous SBRs variables. Also according to the Hansen J 
test we accept the null hypothesis of no endogeneity concluding that the instruments are exogenous, 
uncorrelated with the error term and they have an indirect effect on the outcomes explored through the 
SBRs variables. 
However, the analysis is not without drawbacks. First, the sample of the firms and the period 
examined, and specifically the waves, is very short. Second, another major drawback in our opinion is 
the quality of the job created. In particular, the analysis should be concentrated not only on the quantity 
of the jobs created, but also on the quality, in terms of skills acquired, future perspectives and wage. 
More skilled job may lead also to higher economic growth. 
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(Insert Tables 6-7) 
 
6. Conclusions   
 
This study investigated the determinants of job flows in Egypt and Turkey and the impact of SBRs 
on job flows. The main concluding remarks is that the impact of firm size and age on employment 
growth differs in both economies, while obstacles in the state-business relations have a negative and 
significant impact on the net job creation rates.  
While our main aim of the study was to illustrate the job flows, and their relationship with various 
firm characteristics, the study could have been expanded by exploring also reforms and their impact on 
the productivity and job creation. These reforms could have been used as natural experiments that may 
have created exogenous variations on labour market and firm performance allowing us to explore their 
effects. Nevertheless, we suggest for the future studies the investigation of various reforms, such as 
employment, subsidies to specific industries and regions, and their impact valuation on the above-
mentioned outcomes. Examples include the investment incentives system in Turkey effective as of 
January 1st of 2012, which has been comprised by four schemes, including also investment incentives 
in specific underdeveloped areas. The purpose of these schemes is to support specific sectors and 
industries that are determined in accordance with the scale of the local economy and the potential of the 
region. For Egypt future studies may explore the industrial policy followed over the period 2004-2011, 
including the general authority for investment, free and industrial zones, the income tax law passed in 
2005 and the economic reforms followed after Mubarak in 2011. Using all these policies-reforms as 
possible natural or quasi-natural experiments creating exogenous variation on resource allocation, 
investment, employment and others, may offer valuable insights about their effectiveness and impact.  
Thus, more in-depth investigation and analysis of determinants and reforms that affect the job 
creation rate, productivity and firm performance is important in future studies.  State-business relations 
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can be also important factors. For instance labour and trade regulations may hinder the job creation 
rates, so flexible labour markets could be more desirable; however, the reforms should encourage 
investment and job creation, but also the policy challenges is to improve at the same time the worker 
protection. This is also in line with fact that the countries we explored in this study have a large 
informal economy, where a large proportion of the workers are not registered with the social security 
institution and therefore do not enjoy the protections associated with these systems. Many more cases 
and obstacles can be discussed, but the main point is that state-business relations, among the other 
factors we explored, may determine the job creation and employment growth.   
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Table 1. Variables and Descriptions 
Panel A: Main outcomes and independent variables 
Variable Description Variable Description 
Job Flow The outcomes refer to the variable described in 
the methodology section, including job creation, 
destruction and net job creation and their rates.  
Foreign 
ownership 
A dummy taking value 1 if firm has at least 
10% foreign ownership 
Log(Size) logarithm of total number of employment in 
year t. 
Exporter 
 
A dummy taking value 1  if firm exports at least 
10% of its annual sales 
Log(Size) logarithm of the number of years that the firm 
has been in operation 
Legal status A categorical variable indicating the legal status 
of the firm 1 for Shareholding company with 
shares traded; 2 for Shareholding company with 
shares non-traded; 3 for Sole proprietorship; 4 
for Partnership and 5 for Limited Partnership  
Female 
ownership 
 
A dummy taking value 1 if there is female 
participation in ownership 
Region Sampling region 
Part of Larger 
Firm 
A dummy taking value 1 if the establishment is 
part of a larger firm? 
SBRs State-Business Relations indicating the obstacle 
e.g. of access to finance and credit, electricity, 
corruption, political instability, tax rates and 
others. It takes value 1 if the obstacle is major 
or very severe.  
Quality 
certification 
A dummy taking value 1 if the establishment 
has an internationally- recognized quality 
certification? 
Sector Dummy indicating whether the firm is 
operating in manufacturing or services sector.  
Labour 
productivity 
Annual labour productivity growth is measured 
by a percentage change in labour productivity 
which is the sales divided by the number of full-
time permanent workers.  
ISIC 4-digit International Standard Industrial 
Classification code that applies to the main 
operations of the firms and location 
Panel B:  Instrumental Variables 
Variable Description Variable Description 
IV1 It is my perception that the responses to the 
questions regarding opinions and perceptions 
are”, and the possible answers include a) 
Truthful; b) Somewhat Truthful and c) Not 
truthful 
IV9 Percent of firms that were visited or required to 
meet with tax officials 
IV2 Accuracy of responses to questions regarding 
figures” with the possible answers a) Are taken 
directly from the establishment‟s records; b) 
Are estimates computed with some precision; c) 
Are arbitrary an unreliable numbers and d) 
Some cases in books and some from estimates 
IV10 Percent of firms identifying tax administration 
as a major constraint 
IV3 “This questionnaire was completed in” and the 
possible answers include a) One visit in face-to-
face interview with one person; b) One visit in 
face-to-face interview with different 
managers/staff and c) Several visits. 
IV11 Percent of firms identifying corruption as a 
major constraint 
IV4 Percent of firms identifying access to finance as 
a major constraint 
IV12 Percent of firms identifying transportation as a 
major constraint 
IV5 Percent of firms with loan-credit IV13 Percent of firms identifying electricity as a 
major constraint 
IV6 Percent of firms paying for security IV14 Percent of firms competing against unregistered  
or informal firms 
IV7 Percent of firms identifying crime, theft and 
disorder as a major constraint 
IV15 Percent of firms formally registered when they 
started the operations  
IV8 Percent of firms experiencing losses due to theft 
and vandalism 
IV16 Percent of firms experiencing electrical outages  
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Table 2. Percentage of Firms by Size and Age Class  
 Panel A: Firm Size- All Sectors 
 Small (5-19 employees) Medium (20-99 employees) Large (>99 employees) 
Egypt 63.86 28.74 7.40 
Turkey 60.94 29.69 9.37 
 Panel B: Firm Size- Manufacturing 
Egypt 58.58 31.26 10.16 
Turkey 52.35 37.29 10.36 
 Panel C: Firm Size- Services 
Egypt 69.08 26.24 4.68 
Turkey 68.32 23.16 8.52 
 Panel D: Age- All Sectors 
 Very young (0-2 years) Young (3-5 years) Old (>5 years) 
Egypt 7.54 14.45 78.01 
Turkey 2.21 10.84 86.95 
 Panel E: Age- Manufacturing 
Egypt 6.35 12.99 80.66 
Turkey 3.17 9.03 87.80 
 Panel F: Age- Services 
Egypt 8.71 15.89 75.40 
Turkey 1.38 12.39 86.23 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the control variables 
Panel A: Egypt 
Variable Average Linearized 
Standard Error 
Variable Average Linearized 
Standard Error 
Log of Firm Size 2.740 0.0356 Quality 
certification 
0.104 0.0115 
Log of Firm Age 2.503 0.0358 Labour 
productivity (%) 
-2.969 1.240 
Female ownership 0.068 0.0107 Foreign 
ownership 
6.098 0.6567 
Part of Larger Firm 0.190 0.0149 Exporter 
 
7.600 1.017 
Panel B: Turkey 
Variable Average Linearized 
Standard Error 
Variable Average Linearized 
Standard Error 
Log of Firm Size 2.859 0.0545 Quality 
certification 
0.316 0.0330 
Log of Firm Age 2.551 0.0485 Labour 
productivity (%) 
4.787 1.7913 
Female ownership 0.301 0.0327 Foreign 
ownership (%) 
4.365 0.4913 
Part of Larger Firm 0.087 0.0115 Exporter (%) 
 
20.337 2.2640 
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Figure 1. Histogram for Firm Size Class in Egypt 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Histogram for Firm Size in Turkey 
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Figure 3.Major Obstacles in SBRs for Egypt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.Major Obstacles in SBRs for Turkey 
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Table 4. Job Flows and Rates by Sector  
Sector Gross Job 
Creation  
Gross Job 
Destruction  
Net 
Job Creation  
Gross Job 
Creation 
Rate (%) 
Gross Job 
Destruction 
Rate (%) 
Net 
Job Creation 
Rate (%) 
 Panel A: Egypt 
All 9,079.613 9,001.659 77.954 8.995 8.827 0.168 
Manufacturing 10,436.32 10,347.65 88.670 9.645 9.454 0.191 
Services 6,220.317 6,143.795 76.522 7.601 7.579 0.022 
 Panel B: Turkey 
All 3,183.712 3,314.096 -130.384 2.665 2.672 -0.007 
Manufacturing 3,765.515 3,949.908 -184.393 3.079 3.113 -0.034 
Services 813.930 746.853 67.077 1.141 0.966 0.175 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Job Flows Shares in Employment by Firm Size  
 Egypt Turkey 
Firm 
Size 
Gross 
Job 
Creation 
Rate (%) 
Gross Job 
Destruction 
Rate (%) 
Net 
Job 
Creation 
Rate (%) 
Share in 
Employment 
Gross 
Job 
Creation 
Rate (%) 
Gross Job 
Destruction 
Rate (%) 
Net 
Job 
Creation 
Rate (%) 
Share in 
Employment 
5-19 7.578 7.492 0.086 0.4228 2.369 2.373 -0.004  0.3618 
20-99 8.968 8.828 0.140 0.3373 2.739 2.710 0.029 0.3750 
+100 9.875 9.769 0.106 0.2399 2.915 2.895 0.020 0.2632 
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Figure 5. Net Job Creation Rate by Firm Size: Egypt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Net Job Creation Rate by Firm Age: Egypt 
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Figure 7. Net Job Creation Rate by Firm Size: Turkey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Net Job Creation Rate by Firm Age: Turkey 
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Table 6. Job Flows Regressions in Egypt 
 OLS 2SLS 
Coefficients DV: Gross 
Job Creation 
Rate 
DV: Gross 
Job 
Destruction 
Rate 
DV: Net 
Job Creation 
Rate 
DV: Gross 
Job Creation 
Rate 
DV: Gross 
Job 
Destruction 
Rate 
DV: Net 
Job Creation Rate 
Panel A: Access to Finance and Credit 
Business-Government 
Relations (Major and Severe 
Obstacle) 
-0.0372*** 
(0.0135) 
0.0014 
(0.0060) 
-0.0091** 
(0.0042) 
-0.0451*** 
(0.0129) 
0.0037 
(0.0149) 
-0.0132** 
(0.0064) 
Log of Firm Size  1.7513*** 
(0.6182) 
0.6898 
(0.7849) 
0.1560* 
(0.0886) 
1.8045*** 
(0.6150) 
0.7128 
(0.8321) 
0.1505* 
(0.0772) 
Log of Firm Size Squared -0.1564** 
(0.0732) 
-0.1052 
(0.1322) 
-0.0247** 
(0.0115) 
-0.1524** 
(0.0783) 
-0.0960 
(0.1258) 
-0.0234** 
(0.0106) 
Log of Firm Age 1.4851* 
(0.7629) 
1.6833 
(1.2857) 
0.0237 
(0.1030) 
1.4670* 
(0.7631) 
1.4479 
(1.1372) 
0.0271 
(0.0939) 
Log of Firm Age Squared -0.2720* 
(0.1541) 
-0.2725 
(0.2597) 
-0.0192 
(0.0205) 
-0.2582* 
(0.1362) 
-0.2242 
(0.2120) 
-0.0151 
(0.0189) 
Labour Productivity 0.0114* 
(0.0060) 
0.0058 
(0.0085) 
0.0015* 
(0.0008) 
0.0098* 
(0.0054) 
0.0101 
(0.0099) 
0.0019* 
(0.0011) 
Is one of the owners female? 
(Yes) 
-0.1701 
(0.4930) 
1.4543 
 (1.0616) 
-0.0982 
(0.0864) 
-0.1957 
(0.5373) 
1.3703 
(1.0615) 
-0.1146 
(0.0952) 
Is the firm part of another 
establishment (Yes) 
-0.2583 
(0.5320) 
0.2888 
(0.6361) 
-0.0614 
(0.0721) 
-0.2839 
(0.5691) 
-0.2529 
(0.6268) 
0.0578 
(0.0751) 
Has the firm granted with 
international certification of 
quality (Yes) 
-1.397* 
(0.5690) 
-0.0880 
(0.6943) 
0.0105 
(0.0796) 
-1.3902** 
(0.6717) 
-0.1070 
(0.6811) 
0.0252 
(0.0878) 
Foreign Ownership (Yes) -0.0043 
(0.0055) 
-0.0071 
(0.0090) 
0.0030 
(0.082) 
-0.0038 
(0.0060) 
-0.0108 
(0.0088) 
0.0029 
(0.0053) 
Exporter (Yes) 0.0030 
(0.0064) 
0.0014 
(0.0083) 
 0.0024 
(0.0076) 
0.0045 
(0.0070) 
0.0030 
(0.0091) 
0.0036 
(0.0082) 
Services Sector (reference 
manufacturing) 
-1.0126* 
(0.5780) 
-1.0484* 
(0.5442) 
0.0549 
(0.0549) 
-1.0905** 
(0.5139) 
-1.1508* 
(0.6248) 
0.0580 
(0.0552) 
No. observations 1,383 1,295 2,678 1,321 1,156 2,477 
R-Squared 0.1948 0.1474 0.1264 0.1420 0.1770 0.1052 
Weak Instrument Test    24.042 
[0.000] 
18.329 
[0.000] 
32.331 
[0.000] 
Hansen J Statistics    15.401 
[0.3513] 
11.925 
[0.6123] 
16.362 
[0.2918] 
Panel B: Political Instability 
Business-Government 
Relations (Major and Severe 
Obstacle) 
-0.0076** 
(0.0038) 
0.0055 
(0.0044) 
-0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0281*** 
(0.0105) 
0.0083 
(0.0114) 
-0.0009** 
(0.0004) 
No. observations 1,383 1,295 2,678 1,321 1,156 2,477 
R-Squared 0.1991 0.1505 0.1288 0.2649 0.2709 0.2589 
Weak Instrument Test    17.559 
[0.000] 
16.223 
[0.000] 
20.399 
[0.000] 
Hansen J Statistics    16.678 
[0.2738] 
12.054 
[0.6020] 
18.924 
[0.1679] 
 
.  
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Table 6 (cont.) Job Flows Regressions in Egypt  
 OLS 2SLS 
Coefficients DV: Gross 
Job Creation 
Rate 
DV: Gross 
Job 
Destruction 
Rate 
DV: Net 
Job Creation 
Rate 
DV: Gross 
Job Creation 
Rate 
DV: Gross 
Job 
Destruction 
Rate 
DV: Net 
Job Creation Rate 
Panel C: Electricity 
Business-Government 
Relations (Major and Severe 
Obstacle) 
-0.0028* 
(0.0015) 
0.0086 
(0.0074) 
-0.0019*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0082** 
(0.0038) 
0.0152 
(0.0276) 
-0.0027** 
(0.0012) 
No. observations 1,383 1,295 2,678 1,321 1,156 2,477 
R-Squared 0.1923 0.1500 0.1127 0.1971 0.2210 0.2035 
Weak Instrument Test    12.237 
[0.0003] 
9.216 
[0.0019] 
13.369 
[0.000] 
Hansen J Statistics    20.810 
[0.1066] 
8.619 
[0.0203] 
10.462  
[0.7276] 
Panel D: Corruption 
Business-Government 
Relations (Major and Severe 
Obstacle) 
-0.0072 
(0.0058) 
0.0185*** 
(0.0065) 
-0.0091 
(0.0081) 
-0.0115 
(0.0251) 
0.0264** 
(0.0116) 
-0.0117 
(0.0089) 
No. observations 1,383 1,295 2,678 1,321 1,156 2,477 
R-Squared 0.1939 0.1550 0.1070 0.2735 0.1832  
Weak Instrument Test    8.218 
[0.0255] 
8.608 
[0.0212] 
10.004  
[0.0005] 
Hansen J Statistics    18.481 
[0.1857] 
11.890 
[0.6151] 
18.247  
[0.1958] 
Standard errors within brackets, p-values within square brackets, ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
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Table 7. Job Flows Regressions in Turkey 
 OLS 2SLS 
Coefficients DV: Gross 
Job Creation 
Rate 
DV: Gross 
Job 
Destruction 
Rate 
DV: Net 
Job Creation 
Rate 
DV: Gross 
Job Creation 
Rate 
DV: Gross 
Job 
Destruction 
Rate 
DV: Net 
Job Creation Rate 
Panel A: Access to Finance and Credit 
Business-Government 
Relations (Major and Severe 
Obstacle) 
-0.0089* 
(0.0049) 
0.0114 
(0.0080) 
-0.0052* 
(0.0028) 
-0.0110* 
(0.0060) 
0.0152 
(0.0104) 
-0.0099* 
(0.0531) 
Log of Firm Size  0.9551* 
(0.5601) 
1.0625* 
(0.5709) 
-0.0842 
(0.1110) 
0.9104* 
(0.4930) 
1.1865* 
(0.6440) 
-0.0758 
(0.1202) 
Log of Firm Size Squared -0.0555 
(0.0652) 
-0.0776 
(0.0809) 
0.0148 
(0.0133) 
-0.0616 
(0.0579) 
-0.0766 
(0.0932) 
0.0144 
(0.0142) 
Log of Firm Age -1.6465 
(1.4133) 
-0.0309 
(0.0289) 
-0.1883 
(0.1613) 
-1.5101 
(1.1445) 
-0.0252 
(0.0353) 
-0.2981 
(0.2054) 
Log of Firm Age Squared 0.2477 
(0.2518) 
0.00048 
(0.0006) 
0.0056 
(0.0313) 
0.2225 
(0.2638) 
0.00083 
(0.0007) 
0.00076 
(0.0118) 
Labour Productivity 0.0080* 
(0.0046) 
-0.0042 
(0.0063) 
0.0027** 
(0.0012) 
0.0066* 
(0.0036) 
-0.0041 
(0.0068) 
0.0025** 
(0.0011) 
Is one of the owners female? 
(Yes) 
0.5533** 
(0.2261) 
0.2866 
 (0.6697) 
0.3212** 
(0.1442) 
0.6764** 
(0.2593) 
0.2239 
(0.5478) 
0.2620**  
(0.1283) 
Is the firm part of another 
establishment (Yes) 
0.0086 
(0.0347) 
-0.6609 
(0.6394) 
0.1677** 
(0.0766) 
-0.0088 
(0.0345) 
-0.7289 
(0.6148) 
0.1858** 
(0.0916) 
Has the firm granted with 
international certification of 
quality (Yes) 
0.9622*** 
(0.2181) 
-0.9205* 
(0.5380) 
0.0713** 
(0.0290) 
1.1977*** 
(0.2622) 
-1.3416** 
(0.6002) 
0.0884** 
(0.0360) 
Foreign Ownership (Yes) 0.0118 
(0.0085) 
0.0013 
(0.0123) 
0.0069 
(0.0110) 
0.0145 
(0.0091) 
0.0036 
(0.0112) 
0.0035 
(0.0116) 
Exporter (Yes) 0.0018 
(0.0031) 
0.0042 
(0.0049) 
 0.0016 
(0.0073) 
0.0054 
(0.0036) 
0.0028 
(0.0045) 
0.0012 
(0.0080) 
Services Sector (reference 
manufacturing) 
-2.0262*** 
(0.2577) 
-3.1435*** 
(0.4190) 
-0.0399 
(0.0643) 
-2.1994*** 
(0.2832) 
-3.0569*** 
(0.4349) 
-0.0427 
(0.0732) 
No. observations 1,066 792 1,858 1,032 762 1,794 
R-Squared 0.3124 0.3642 0.1853 0.2857 0.3699 0.1986 
Weak Instrument Test    15.892 
[0.000] 
13.788 
[0.000] 
22.114  
[0.000] 
Hansen J Statistics    10.771 
[0.7040] 
17.268 
[0.2422] 
13.321 
[0.5014] 
Panel B: Political Instability 
Business-Government 
Relations (Major and Severe 
Obstacle) 
-0.0018 
(0.0103) 
0.0336*** 
(0.0105) 
-0.0032** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0030 
(0.0126) 
 
0.0491*** 
(0.0182) 
-0.0056** 
(0.0024) 
No. observations 1,066 792 1,858 1,032 762 1,794 
R-Squared 0.2674 0.3845 0.1859 0.2936 0.3561 0.1841 
Weak Instrument Test    14.792  
[0.000] 
6.524 
[0.0537] 
8.910 
[0.0148] 
Hansen J Statistics    12.534 
[0.5636] 
19.009 
[0.1646] 
11.496  
[0.6467] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
Table 7 (cont.) Job Flows Regressions in Turkey  
 OLS 2SLS 
Coefficients DV: Gross 
Job Creation 
Rate 
DV: Gross 
Job 
Destruction 
Rate 
DV: Net 
Job Creation 
Rate 
DV: Gross 
Job Creation 
Rate 
DV: Gross 
Job 
Destruction 
Rate 
DV: Net 
Job Creation Rate 
Panel C: Practices of Competitors in the Informal Sector 
Business-Government 
Relations (Major and Severe 
Obstacle) 
-0.0073** 
(0.0035) 
0.0014 
(0.0029) 
-0.0026 
(0.0080) 
-0.0122* 
(0.0069) 
0.0060 
(0.0130) 
-0.0057 
(0.0022) 
No. observations 1,066 792 1,858 1,032 762 1,794 
R-Squared 0.2729 0.3644 0.1847 0.2922 0.3887 0.1983 
Weak Instrument Test    19.125 
[0.000] 
15.765 
[0.000] 
19.652  
[0.000] 
Hansen J Statistics    12.288 
[0.5832] 
17.332 
[0.2389] 
13.524 
[0.4857] 
Panel D: Tax Rates 
Business-Government 
Relations (Major and Severe 
Obstacle) 
-0.0057** 
(0.0025) 
0.0133** 
(0.0057) 
-0.0158** 
(0.0074) 
-0.0075*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0182*** 
(0.0062) 
-0.0151* 
(0.0015) 
No. observations 1,066 792 1,858 1,032 762 1,794 
R-Squared 0.1536 0.2027 0.1932 0.2735 0.1916  
Weak Instrument Test    15.716 
[0.000] 
21.155 
[0.000] 
26.853 
[0.000] 
Hansen J Statistics    13.344 
[0.4997] 
13.989 
[0.4506] 
15.743 
[0.3293] 
Standard errors within brackets, p-values within square brackets, ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
